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DOES STRICKLAND PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS ON
DEATH ROW?
Kenneth Williams *
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether one ends up on death row is usually determined not
by the heinousness of the crime, but by the quality of trial coun-
sel.' The public has increasingly been made aware of this fact.2
There have been stories about sleeping lawyers,' missed dead-
lines,4 alcoholic and disoriented lawyers,5 and lawyers who failed
to vigorously defend their clients.6 Several Supreme Court justic-
es have acknowledged the problem.7 The United States Senate
* Copyright Kenneth Williams, 2009. Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. I
would like to thank Professor Janine Kim of Marquette Law School for reading a draft of
the article and providing input. I would also like to thank the faculty of the University of
Miami School of Law for providing helpful comments and for inviting me to present the
article at one of its faculty symposiums.
1. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836-37 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Executions Resume, as Do Questions of Fairness, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2008, at Al ("The release of the third death row inmate in six months in
North Carolina last week is raising fresh questions about whether states are supplying
capital-murder defendants with adequate counsel....").
3. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that de-
fendant had ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer slept through significant
portions of his capital murder trial). But see Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743,748-49
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding no ineffective assistance even though lead counsel slept
through nearly entire trial).
4. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Date Missed, Court Rebuffs Low-I.Q. Man Facing Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2005, at A14 (detailing case of Marvin Lee Wilson, who "made a pri-
ma facie showing of mental retardation," but was unable to pursue the claim because his
lawyers missed the filing deadline (quoting In re Wilson, 433 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2005),
withdrawn, 442 F.3d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 2000))).
5. See, e.g., Susannah A. Nesmith, Jimmy Ryce Case: Defense Attorney Says He Told
Boy's Killer To Lie on Stand, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 2007, at Al ("[A lawyer] told his
client to lie on the stand because he was on medication and 'disoriented' during the trial.").
6. See, e.g., Susannah A. Nesmith, Jimmy Ryce Case: Dad: Boy a Pawn in 'Ego Con-
test" Between Lawyers, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 12, 2007, at B5 (assistant public defender ac-
cused public defender of hindering accused killer's defense for political reasons).
7. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked, "I have yet to see a death case, among the
dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the defendant
1459
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
held a hearing on the problem of inadequate counsel in death pe-
nalty cases,' and President Bush even addressed the issue in his
2005 State of the Union address.9 The public has not been made
aware, however, of the fact that very few defendants who receive
substandard representation have been successful in overturning
their convictions on appeal.1 °
was well represented at trial." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Remarks at the University of the District of Columbia David A.
Clarke School of Law Joseph L. Rauh Lecture: In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers
Who Care (Apr. 9, 2001), http://supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-04-09-Ola.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009). Former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor had this to say on the top-
ic: "Serious questions are being raised about whether the death penalty is being fairly ad-
ministered in this country. Perhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed
counsel in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are
used." Sandra Day O'Conner, Former Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Speech to the Minnesota Women Lawyers (July 2, 2001), http://www.the justice-
project.org/national/problem (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). In an address to the American Bar
Association, Justice John Paul Stevens said:
[Justice Thurgood Marshall's] rejection of the death penalty rested on prin-
ciples that would be controlling even if error never infected the criminal
process. Since his retirement, with the benefit of DNA evidence, we have
learned that a substantial number of death sentences have been imposed er-
roneously. That evidence is profoundly significant-not only because of its re-
levance to the debate about the wisdom of continuing to administer capital
punishment, but also because it indicates that there must be serious flaws in
our administration of criminal justice. Many thoughtful people have quickly
concluded that inadequate legal representation explains those errors. It is
true, as many have pointed out and as our cases reveal, that a significant
number of defendants in capital cases have not been provided with fully com-
petent legal representation at trial.
Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall
Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
8. On April 8, 2008, the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on
"The Adequacy of Representation in Capital Cases." See The Adequacy of Representation
in Capital Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008). The transcript of the hearing is available at http://judi
ciary.senate.gov/resources/ll0transcripts.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
9. In his February 2005 State of the Union address, President Bush said:
Because one of the main sources of our national unity is our belief in equal
justice, we need to make sure Americans of all races and backgrounds have
confidence in the system that provides justice. In America, we must make
doubly sure no person is held to account for a crime he or she did not commit,
so we are dramatically expanding the use of DNA evidence to prevent wrong-
ful conviction. Soon I will send to Congress a proposal to fund special training
for defense counsel in capital cases, because people on trial for their lives
must have competent lawyers by their side.
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 41 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 126, 130 (Feb. 2, 2005).
10. See, e.g., Stephen Henderson, Bad Defense Often Slides in Death Cases, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 21, 2007, at Al (describing a study of eighty death penalty
cases from Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia regarding the poor quality of legal
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In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant seeking to overturn his conviction on grounds of inef-
fective assistance of counsel must demonstrate not only that his
attorney performed deficiently, but also that he was prejudiced as
a result of counsel's performance.11 The prejudice standard has
proven to be so onerous that few defendants are able to satisfy it.
Justice Marshall was prophetic in his Strickland dissent, predict-
ing that very few defendants would be able to satisfy the burden
of proving prejudice. 2 The purpose of this article is to demon-
strate that Justice Marshall was correct in his prediction and to
make the case that the prejudice prong of Strickland needs to be
eliminated rather than re-tooled. To buttress this argument, I
conducted a survey of lower court decisions both before and after
the Supreme Court's decision in Wiggins v. Smith,"' which was
intended to ameliorate the harshness of Strickland's prejudice
requirement. Results indicate that capital defendants did not
achieve any greater success in obtaining relief after Wiggins than
they did before Wiggins. 4
Part II begins with a discussion of the numerous problems that
are created when defendants are not properly represented. Part
III provides a full discussion of Strickland, Justice Marshall's
concerns regarding the majority's adoption of a prejudice re-
quirement, and how the prejudice requirement often results in a
breakdown in the adversarial system. Part IV analyzes three
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court designed to clarify
Strickland, and presumably, to make it easier for defendants to
prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Part V presents the results of a survey of circuit court decisions
conducted to gauge the impact of the Court's decision in Wiggins,
which was the most important decision of those cases intended to
clarify the Strickland test. The article concludes that, while sub-
sequent decisions have improved some aspects of Strickland, es-
pecially for defendants whose attorneys performed poorly during
the sentencing phase of their capital case, the concerns that Jus-
tice Marshall expressed regarding the prejudice prong persist,
representation in death penalty cases and the failure of appellate courts to reverse convic-
tions in most of those cases).
11. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
12. See id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514 (2003).
14. Part V, infra.
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and defendants have not achieved any greater success in obtain-
ing relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Part VI, I discuss a case that I litigated to illustrate the con-
tinuing problems with the prejudice prong of Strickland. Part VII
discusses some proposals that others have made for improving
the prejudice prong. The article concludes that, because tinkering
with the prejudice requirement has not proven to be successful
and will not be successful in the future, it is best to eliminate the
requirement that capital defendants prove prejudice in order to
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, at-
tached is an appendix containing a brief synopsis of the successful
cases five years before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Wiggins v. Smith. 5
This article focuses on the urgent need to eliminate the preju-
dice prong in capital cases. As the Supreme Court has frequently
stated, "death is different." 6 There is no doubt that many other
defendants have been poorly represented. 7 It may well be the
case that the prejudice prong is also problematic in non-capital
cases, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
15. App'x, infra.
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("[Plenalty of death is different in kind
from any other punishment . . . ."); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that "[dleath is a unique punishment" and that
"[d]eath. . . is in a class by itself"). The Supreme Court has invoked the argument that
"death is different" to justify careful scrutiny of capital cases and to provide heightened
protections to capital defendants. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (holding that because death is "qualitatively different," a sentencer cannot be
precluded from considering as a mitigating factor "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(Brennan J., concurring) (noting that a mandatory death sentence statute is invalid be-
cause "penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, howev-
er long"). Other proposals to treat capital cases differently have been made. For instance,
Justice Marshall suggested that in order to eliminate the problems of death-qualified ju-
ries (juries more likely to convict), two separate juries should be employed in capital cases.
See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 203-06 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). One jury
would determine whether the defendant is guilty while the other jury would determine
punishment. Id. at 203-04 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968)).
17. See e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S HEARING ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 38 (2004) (finding that "[florty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent
defense in the United States remains in a state of crisis").
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II. CONSEQUENCES OF BAD LAWYERING
Incompetent attorneys create numerous problems for their
clients. The most serious problem they create is the risk that
their clients will be wrongly convicted. Wrongful convictions have
become a systemic problem in the criminal justice system."8
Wrongful convictions in capital cases are especially problematic
because of the risk that an unjust execution may occur. The
Death Penalty Information Center has identified eight individu-
als who were executed despite serious uncertainty about their
guilt.19 There is no need, however, to speculate about the possibil-
ity of wrongful convictions in capital cases. Since 1973, 130 indi-
viduals in twenty-six states have been released from death row
because of evidence of their innocence.2 °
Many factors contribute to wrongful convictions. For instance,
prosecutorial misconduct, misidentifications, false confessions,
jailhouse snitch testimony, and junk science have all been identi-
fied as factors. 21 No factor probably contributes more to wrongful
convictions than inadequate counsel.22 A competent attorney will
conduct a thorough investigation. She will follow leads, interview
witnesses, pursue alibis, and consult experts. She will put herself
in position to uncover prosecutorial misconduct, to effectively
cross-examine witnesses about mistaken identifications, to un-
dermine the credibility of questionable jailhouse snitches who
may fabricate testimony to curry favor with the prosecution, and
to challenge the state's "experts." In short, a competent attorney
is able to challenge the state's case. When an attorney is able to
effectively challenge the state's case, the chance of a wrongful
conviction diminishes substantially.
18. For a study of exonerations in the United States, see Samuel R. Gross et al., Ex-
onerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523
(2005).
19. Death Penalty Information Center, Executed but Possibly Innocent, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1935 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
20. Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death
Row (2008), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009).
21. Barry Scheck, Innocence, Race, and the Death Penalty, 50 HOW. L.J. 445, 451
(2007); see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 210 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); Gross et
al., supra note 18, at 530-31.
22. Scheck, supra note 21, at 451.
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Since the Supreme Court restored capital punishment,23 it has
sought to identify and limit the punishment to those most deserv-
ing death. In order to achieve this objective, the Court has man-
dated that defendants be allowed to present a wide range of miti-
gating evidence,24 that capital punishment be restricted to the
most culpable defendants,25 and that the jury be selected more
carefully.26 Not surprisingly, bad lawyering makes it more diffi-
cult to identify those most deserving death. As a result of inade-
quate defense counsel, juries often do not learn of mitigating evi-
dence, and problematic jurors are not removed from the venire.
Incompetent defense counsel often present problems for their
clients even after the representation has ended. A timely objec-
tion is usually required to preserve an issue for appellate re-
view. The failure of defense counsel to make a timely objection
prevents defendants from raising an issue on appeal.2 8 Counsel
can also impact an inmate's chances for success in collateral pro-
ceedings. An inmate seeking habeas relief must present his
claims in state court. If counsel fails to exhaust the inmate's
claims in state court, he is usually precluded from obtaining relief
in federal court.3" A number of capital defendants have been una-
23. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
24. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (plurality opinion).
25. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of death on juvenile offenders since their diminished mental ca-
pacity makes them less culpable for their crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306,
321 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded offenders because they are less
culpable for their crimes); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (limiting death pe-
nalty to those offenders with highly culpable mental states).
26. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-26 (1985) (holding that prospective ju-
rors cannot be excluded for cause because of their opposition to capital punishment unless
they are "unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law").
27. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d
607, 614-15 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that to preserve a claim for federal review, a de-
fendant must make a specific and timely objection at the time of the allegedly objectiona-
ble conduct).
28. E.g., 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 342 (2007).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) (precluding inmates from receiving federal
habeas relief "unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State").
30. See id. The Supreme Court has held that claims forfeited under state law can be
considered on the merits in federal habeas proceedings only if the inmate can demonstrate
cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error. See Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 485-87 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982). But see House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006) (recognizing a "miscarriage of justice" exception permitting
claims not raised in state court to be considered in federal habeas proceedings if petitioner
can demonstrate "that, in light of new evidence, 'it is more likely than not that no reason-
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ble to have their claims, including claims of innocence, considered
on the merits in federal court because of their attorneys' failure to
present their claims during the state court proceedings.31
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE TO INCOMPETENT
COUNSEL: STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON
In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized a right to
counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases.32 However, the
standard for determining whether counsel performed effectively
was extremely low. Some courts adopted a "farce-and-mockery"
standard.33 As the term implies, counsel's representation passed
constitutional muster as long as it did not make a "farce and
mockery" of the proceedings. 4 Other courts adopted a "reasonable
competence" test,35 which required counsel's performance to be
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in crimi-
nal cases."36 These tests proved to be inadequate and led the Su-
preme Court to adopt a two-prong test for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington."
able juror would have found petitioner found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt'" (quoting
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
31. See Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full
Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Con-
stitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1836 (2000).
32. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("[TIhe necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that
the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was ... a denial
of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."). In Gideon v. Wain-
wright, the right to counsel was extended to most indigent defendants. 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963). The Court has not extended this right to post-conviction proceedings in capital cas-
es. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). For an argument that the right to
counsel should be extended to post-conviction proceedings, see Eric M. Freedman, Fewer
Risks, More Benefits: What Governments Gain by Acknowledging the Right to Competent
Counsel on State Post-Conviction Review in Capital Cases, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183
(2006).
33. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 713 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing State v. Pacheco, 588 P.2d 830, 833 (Ariz. 1978); Hoover v. State, 606 S.W.2d 749, 751
(Ark. 1980); Line v. State, 397 N.E.2d 975, 976 (Ind. 1979)).
34. John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, "It's Like Ddjet Vu All Over Again": Wil-
liams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guide-
lines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 131 (2007).
35. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 713-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Trapnell v. United
States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
36. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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In Strickland, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner had to prove that
counsel performed deficiently and that the petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result.3" In evaluating the deficient performance
prong, reviewing courts were instructed to give deference to coun-
sel's strategic decisions. Most importantly, the Court indicated
that in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, re-
viewing courts could resolve the claim by assessing whether the
petitioner had been prejudiced without even addressing counsel's
performance.40
Justice Marshall dissented and issued a strong critique of the
majority's two-prong approach to deciding claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.41 He felt that the majority's two-prong test
would prove to be unhelpful because the deficient performance
prong would be "so malleable that, in practice, it will either have
no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in
which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by differ-
ent courts."42 He also thought the adoption of "more specific" and
"particularized" standards would be a better approach.43
Justice Marshall provided two reasons for rejecting the preju-
dice prong.44 First, he believed that it would be difficult for a re-
viewing court to assess the impact of counsel's performance based
on a "cold record."45 As Justice Marshall indicated, lawyers do
make a difference, and "[s]eemingly impregnable cases can some-
times be dismantled by good defense counsel."46 Second, Justice
Marshall thought the constitutional guarantee of effective assis-
tance of counsel should both prevent the conviction of innocent
38. Id.
39. Id. at 689.
40. Id. at 697 ("[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was defi-
cient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies."). Many courts have disposed of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by
resolving the prejudice prong and thereby avoiding an evaluation of defense counsel's per-
formance. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cross v. DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir.
1987) (proceeding directly to prejudice prong since performance issue requires "a particu-
larly subtle assessment").
41. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 707.
43. Id. at 708-09.
44. Id. at 710.
45. Id.
46. Id. One only needs to recall the O.J. Simpson case as an illustration of this point.
See Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1996).
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persons and ensure "that convictions are obtained only through
fundamentally fair procedures."47 He rejected the majority's view
"that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly
guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was
represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney.""
Justice Marshall's concerns proved to be valid. The Strickland
analysis did not work much better than the tests previously em-
ployed due to the Court's failure to adopt particularized stan-
dards49 and the Court's adoption of the prejudice prong.5" Most
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected after
Strickland, even in death penalty cases where counsel's perfor-
mance was notoriously bad.51 As a result, the two-prong Strick-
land test has been harshly criticized by scholars52 and even by
members of the bench.53 The Court evidently recognized that the
47. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 34, at 134; Richard Klein, The Constitutionali-
zation of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1999).
50. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 133 (1995).
51. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 1, at 1857-66 (discussing the shortcomings of the
Strickland standard and the poor quality of legal representation in death penalty cases
that satisfies the competency standard under Strickland).
52. See Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on
Crime," but Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 479, 498 (1995) ("The Supreme
Court shares a major responsibility for the shameful quality of counsel that is tolerated in
the nation's courts."); Geimer, supra note 50, at 93 ("Directly contrary to its rhetoric in
Strickland, the Court has effectively ensured that Gideon guarantees little more than the
presence of a person with a law license alongside the accused during trial.") (footnote omit-
ted); Klein, supra note 49, at 1446 ("[Tlhe Strickland Court interpreted the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel in such an ultimately
meaningless manner as to require little more than a warm body with a law degree stand-
ing next to the defendant.") (footnotes omitted).
53. For example, Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit stated:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the ac-
cused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel. It
requires representation only by a lawyer who is not ineffective under the
standard set by Strickland v. Washington. Proof that the lawyer was ineffec-
tive requires proof not only that the lawyer bungled but also that his errors
likely affected the result. Ineffectiveness is not measured against the stan-
dards set by good lawyers but by the average--"reasonableness under pre-
vailing professional norms"-and "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential." Consequently, accused persons who are
represented by "not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die
when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at
least the clemency of a life sentence.
Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring) (citations omit-
ted).
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Strickland standard was not functioning as it had hoped and
moved toward adopting Justice Marshall's position in several
subsequent cases.
IV. WILLIAMS, WIGGINS, AND ROMPILLA: A GLIMMER OF HOPE?
The Supreme Court recognized the need for clarification of the
two-prong Strickland test and attempted to do so in three subse-
quent decisions, which will be discussed below. Additionally, in
Florida v. Nixon, the Court clarified that defense counsel's trial
strategy is not a valid basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. This case is also discussed below.
A. Williams v. Taylor
Terry Williams was convicted of capital murder after robbing
and killing a neighbor for "a couple of dollars." 4 At his sentencing
hearing, the prosecution's two experts testified that "there was a
'high probability' that Williams would pose a serious continuing
threat to society."5 Williams's trial counsel offered the testimony
of Williams's mother and neighbors, which described Williams as
a "nice boy."56 The court noted that "[o]ne of the neighbors had not
been previously interviewed by defense counsel, but was noticed
by counsel in the audience during the proceedings and asked to
testify on the spot."57 Defense counsel's closing argument was
primarily devoted to explaining that it was difficult to find a rea-
son why the jury should spare Williams's life."8
Williams's trial attorneys, however, did not present any evi-
dence of the defendant's "nightmarish" childhood. 9 They did not
mention the fact that Williams's parents had been imprisoned for
criminal neglect, that his childhood home had feces and urine on
the floor, that the children in his household were dirty and with-
out clothing, and that four of the children were found to be under
the influence of whiskey.6 ° Williams also had been repeatedly
54. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367-68 (2000).
55. Id. at 368-69.
56. Id. at 369.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 395.
60. Id. at 395 & n.19.
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beaten by his father, placed in foster care while his parents were
in prison, and returned to his parents' custody upon their re-
lease.6' Trial counsel also neglected to present evidence that Wil-
liams was "borderline mentally retarded."6 2 Additionally, they
failed to point out that the prosecution experts "believed that Wil-
liams, if kept in a 'structured environment,' would not pose a fu-
ture danger to society. "63
The Supreme Court found that trial counsel performed defi-
ciently.' Counsel's failure to conduct an investigation that would
have uncovered the evidence described easily satisfied the defi-
cient-performance prong of the Strickland test.65 The Court also
found that Williams had been prejudiced by counsel's perfor-
mance because the cumulative effect of the mitigation evidence
may have made a difference to the jury had it been presented.66
B. Wiggins v. Smith
Three years later, Kevin Wiggins challenged the adequacy of
his representation at a capital sentencing proceeding following
his conviction for capital murder.67 An investigation into Wig-
gins's background would have revealed that he suffered severe
abuse as a young child living with an "alcoholic, absentee moth-
er."68 Counsel also would have learned that Wiggins and his sibl-
ings were frequently left alone and forced to "beg for food and to
eat paint chips and garbage," 9 that he was physically tortured
and repeatedly raped while in foster care,7 ° and that he ran away
from the abuse and began living on the streets at a young age.7'
According to the Supreme Court, this is "the kind of troubled his-
tory" that is "relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpabili-
ty."
72
61. Id. at 395.
62. Id. at 396.
63. Id. at 371.
64. Id. at 396.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 396-98.
67. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514 (2003).
68. Id. at 535.
69. Id. at 516-17.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Id. at 517.
72. Id. at 535.
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Counsel, however, chose to "focus their efforts on 'retry[ing] the
factual case' and disputing Wiggins' direct responsibility for the
murder."73 The Court found that, although this was a strategic
decision, it was not an informed decision based on the benefit of
an investigation into all the facts and therefore was not reasona-
ble: "We base our conclusion on the much more limited principle
that 'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable' only to the extent that 'reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation."'74
The Court also found that Wiggins had been prejudiced by
counsel's performance.7" In light of Wiggins's "excruciating life
history" and the absence of any record of violent conduct to offset
the "powerful mitigating narrative," the Court concluded that
there was a reasonable probability that the jury, confronted with
evidence of Wiggins's background, would have returned a differ-
ent verdict.1
6
C. Rompilla v. Beard
Rompilla also involved a challenge to trial counsel's perfor-
mance in the sentencing phase of a capital case.77 Ronald Rompil-
la's severely alcoholic parents reared him in a slum environment
and physically and verbally abused him.78 Rompilla's parents
kept him and his siblings isolated in a filthy home without indoor
plumbing, forced him to sleep in an attic with no heat, and did
not provide clothing for their children, who were forced to attend
school in rags.79 Rompilla also suffered from organic brain dam-
age, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, and mental retardation.8 0 Defense
counsel failed to discover any of this evidence and, therefore, it
was not presented to the jury.8 ' The Supreme Court held that
Rompilla was prejudiced by counsel's failure to discover and
73. Id. at 517.
74. Id. at 533 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)).
75. Id. at 535-38.
76. Id. at 536-37.
77. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 378-79 (2005).
78. Id. at 391-92.
79. Id. at 392.
80. Id. at 392-93.
81. Id. at 392.
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present this mitigation evidence because it may have influenced
the jury's appraisal of Rompilla's culpability. 2
D. Florida v. Nixon
In Nixon, unlike Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the Su-
preme Court found that counsel's performance was reasonable
under the very unusual circumstances of the case. 3 The State
had overwhelming evidence of Nixon's guilt: he confessed to the
police, his brother, and his girlfriend that he had kidnapped a
stranger, stolen her car, and burned her alive; before the murder,
an eyewitness saw Nixon and the victim together at a shopping
center; Nixon was seen driving the victim's car after her death;
his palm print was found on the trunk of the car; and pawnshop
records verified that Nixon had pawned her rings following her
death. 4 After deposing the State's witnesses, trial counsel de-
cided to concede guilt and instead focus on the sentencing phase
in order to save Nixon's life. 5 During the sentencing phase, coun-
sel presented extensive evidence that Nixon was "not normal or-
ganically, intellectually, emotionally or educationally or in any
other way."8 6 Nixon never agreed or objected to defense counsel's
strategy.8 7 He later claimed that counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to obtain his consent to concede guilt and for pursuing such a
strategy.88 The Supreme Court held that, given the strength of
the prosecution's case, trial counsel made a reasonable strategic
decision in focusing his efforts on trying to prevent his client's ex-
ecution. 9
E. Clarification of the Strickland Test
Williams, Wiggins, Rompilla, and Nixon have proven helpful in
clarifying several aspects of the Strickland two-prong test. First,
these decisions make clear that an attorney has an obligation to
conduct a reasonable investigation of both the guilt-innocence
82. Id. at 393.
83. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 189-92 (2004).
84. Id. at 179-80.
85. Id. at 180-81.
86. Id. at 183.
87. Id. at 181.
88. Id. at 185.
89. Id. at 190-92.
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and punishment phases of a capital case."° If counsel has been
apprised of a possible defense or has been alerted to possible mi-
tigating evidence, she has an obligation to follow through on the
information she has received.9 Second, an attorney's strategic de-
cisions should continue to receive deference as long as they are
reasonable under the circumstances.92 The Court has also made it
clear, however, that counsel cannot make strategic decisions until
he has conducted a complete investigation. 93 Finally, the Supreme
Court has clarified that lower courts should refer to the American
Bar Association ("ABA") Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases in determin-
ing whether counsel's performance was reasonable. 94
These decisions were also intended to clarify the showing re-
quired to prove prejudice, at least during the sentencing phase of
a capital case. Part V discusses the results of a survey that I con-
ducted on how capital defendants claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel have fared since Wiggins, as this was the most influen-
tial of the Supreme Court's decisions intended to clarify Strick-
land.
V. STUDY OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
To determine the impact of the Wiggins decision, I conducted a
survey of decisions by the most active death penalty circuits: the
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Specifically, I sought
to determine the records of these circuits on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in capital cases in the five years before and
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Quarterman, 515 F.3d 392, 405 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Generally ac-
cepted standards of competence require that counsel conduct an investigation into peti-
tioner's background." (citing Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 344 (5th Cir. 2003))); Soffar
v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 477 n.40 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We recognize that Wiggins was decided
in the context of a defense counsel's decision regarding whether to offer a mitigation case
during the sentencing phase of the trial. However, this is a difference without distinction.
Whether the failure to conduct a reasonable investigation occurs at the sentencing phase
or the guilt phase should warrant no meaningful distinction in defining a person's right to
effective assistance of counsel. The two-prong test established in Strickland applies to
both phases of trial.").
91. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003).
92. See, e.g., Quarterman, 471 F.3d at 570 (stating that counsel should present "all
reasonably available evidence in mitigation unless there are strong strategic reasons to
forgo some portion of such evidence").
93. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533.
94. See id. at 524.
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after the 2003 Wiggins decision. 5 The Fourth Circuit considered
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in thirty-seven capital
cases following Wiggins and denied relief on each occasion.96 Dur-
ing the five years prior to Wiggins, the Fourth Circuit also did not
grant relief to a single petitioner, though the court considered for-
ty claims. The Fifth Circuit considered eighty-one ineffective as-
95. The author searched LexisNexis's online database to conduct this survey. Each
circuit was searched individually, i.e., the "4th Circuit-Federal & State Cases, Com-
bined," "5th Circuit-Federal & State Cases, Combined," "9th Circuit-Federal & State
Cases, Combined," and "11th & Former 5th Circuits-Federal & State Cases, Combined."
For the 1998-2003 time period, the following search terms were entered into the Terms
and Connectors search box: "Strickland" & "death penalty." For the 2003-2008 time pe-
riod, the following search terms were entered into the Terms and Connectors search box:
"Strickland" & "death penalty." The author considered only those cases brought before the
Courts of Appeals of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Those cases that
were non-capital cases; cases in which a claimant was granted a certificate of appealabili-
ty, but has not yet succeeded or failed on the merits of the claim; those cases which were
denied on procedural grounds, including those claims decided on both procedural and non-
procedural grounds; and those cases later reversed or vacated and remanded by the Su-
preme Court of the United States were not included in the survey. Those cases later over-
ruled on grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel are included in this survey
and their subsequent history is excluded, as that is irrelevant for purposes of this survey.
96. See Cole v. Branker, No. 07-20, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22905, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov.
3, 2008); Jackson v. Johnson, 523 F.3d 273, 281 (4th Cir. 2008); Yarbrough v. Johnson, 520
F.3d 329, 344 (4th Cir. 2008); Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2008); Bell
v. Kelly, 260 F. App'x 599, 606 (4th Cir. 2008); Bowie v. Branker, 512 F.3d 112, 114 (4th
Cir. 2008); Call v. Branker, 254 F. App'x 257, 259 (4th Cir. 2007); Meyer v. Branker, 506
F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478, 490 (4th Cir. 2007); Mac-
Neill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 209 (4th Cir. 2007); Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 156 (4th
Cir. 2007); Shuler v. Ozmint, 209 F. App'x 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2006); Schmitt v. Kelly, 189
F. App'x 257, 258 (4th Cir. 2006); Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 2006);
Campbell v. Polk, 447 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006); Lenz v. Washington, 444 F.3d 295,
298 (4th Cir. 2006); Hedrick v. True, 443 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2006); Reid v. True, 349
F.3d 788, 794 (4th Cir. 2006); Vinson v. True, 436 F.3d 412, 416 (4th Cir. 2005); Brown v.
Polk, 135 F. App'x 618, 619, (4th Cir. 2005); Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir.
2005); Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2005); Walker v. True, 401 F.3d 574, 576
(4th Cir. 2005); Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257, 259 (4th Cir. 2005); Humphries v. Ozmint,
397 F.3d 206, 227 (4th Cir. 2005); Draughn v. Johnson, 120 F. App'x 940, 941 (4th Cir.
2005); McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691, 732 (4th Cir. 2004); Syriani v. Polk, 118 F. App'x
706, 708 (4th Cir. 2004); James v. Harrison, 389 F.3d 450, 452 (4th Cir. 2004); Kandies v.
Polk, 385 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004); Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir.
2004); Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2004); Bailey v. True, 100 F. App'x
128, 129 (4th Cir. 2004); Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 2003); Orbe v. True,
82 F. App'x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2003); Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2003);
Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 205 (4th Cir. 2003).
97. See Hill v. Polk, 339 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2003); Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229,
231 (4th Cir. 2003); Rowsey v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 2003); Swisher v. True, 325
F.3d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 2003); Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 461-62 (4th Cir. 2003);
Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477, 490 (4th Cir. 2003); Bramblett v. True, 59 F. App'x 1, 16 (4th
Cir. 2003); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 327 (4th Cir. 2002); Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284,
286 (4th Cir. 2002); Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 2002), overruled by
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 2002);
McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2002); Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 580
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sistance claims by death row inmates after Wiggins" and granted
(4th Cir. 2001); Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 392 (4th Cir. 2001); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d
676, 680 (4th Cir. 2001); Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2001); Frye v. Lee,
235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000); Skipper v. Lee, No. 00-8, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33346,
at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000); Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 2000); Tucker v.
Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 614 (4th Cir. 2000); Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 321 (4th Cir.
2000); Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 295-98 (4th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d
438, 454 (4th Cir. 2000); Barnabei v. Angelone, 214 F.3d 463, 472 (4th Cir. 2000); Clagett
v. Angelone, 209 F.3d 370, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2000); Graham v. Angelone, No. 99-4, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 22080, at *52 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999); Harris v. French, No. 98-34, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 15794, at *34-36 (4th Cir. July 14, 1999); Williams v. Angelone, No. 98-
28, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8139, at *16 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 1999); Rocheville v. Moore, No.
98-23, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4222, at *15-16 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999); Thomas v. Taylor,
170 F.3d 466, 473 (4th Cir. 1999); Drayton v. Moore, No. 98-18, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 345,
at *6 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999); Jenkins v. Angelone, No. 98-13, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 342,
at *2-3 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999); Chichester v. Taylor, No. 98-15, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
104, at *18-19 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1999); Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 884 (4th Cir. 1998);
Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 862 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled by Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362 (2000); Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1998); Fry v. Angelone, No. 98-
8, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27502, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1998); Ward v. French, No. 98-7,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27077, at *27 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d
396, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1998); Williams v. French, 146 F.3d 203, 213 (4th Cir. 1998); Huf-
fington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 583 (4th Cir. 1998).
Though the Fourth Circuit denied relief in Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 862 (4th
Cir. 1998), and Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2002), the Supreme Court of
the United States later reversed and granted the inmates' claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000).
98. Moore v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 454, 457 (5th Cir. 2008); Villegas v. Quarterman,
274 F. App'x 378, 379 (5th Cir. 2008); Hudson v. Quarterman, 273 F. App'x 331, 332 (5th
Cir. 2008); Reis v. Quarterman, 522 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2008); Martinez v. Quarter-
man, 270 F. App'x 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2008); Bishop v. Epps, 265 F. App'x 285, 295 (5th Cir.
2008); Smith v. Quarterman, 515 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2008); Perkins v. Quarterman,
254 F. App'x 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2007); Wood v. Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 410 (5th Cir.
2007); Bower v. Quarterman, 497 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2007); Coble v. Quarterman, 496
F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 2007); Diaz v. Quarterman, 239 F. App'x 886, 887 (5th Cir. 2007);
Manns v. Quarterman, 236 F. App'x 908, 916 (5th Cir. 2007); Berry v. Epps, 230 F. App'x
386, 388 (5th Cir. 2007); Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 2007);
Smith v. Quarterman, 222 F. App'x 406, 407 (5th Cir. 2007); Turner v. Quarterman, 481
F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2007); Martinez v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2007);
Sonnier v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349, 359-61 (5th Cir. 2007); Conner v. Quarterman, 477
F.3d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2007); Parr v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 245, 261 (5th Cir. 2006);
Smith v. Quarterman, 471 F.3d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 2006); St. Aubin v. Quarterman, 470
F.3d 1096, 1097 (5th Cir. 2006); Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 592 (5th Cir. 2006);
Rodriguez v. Quarterman, 204 F. App'x 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Quarterman,
204 F. App'x 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2006); Gutierrez v. Quarterman, 201 F. App'x 196, 198 (5th
Cir. 2006); Whitaker v. Quarterman, 200 F. App'x 351, 352 (5th Cir. 2006); Reyes v. Quar-
terman, 195 F. App'x 272, 273 (5th Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 654,
656 (5th Cir. 2006); Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2006); Gonzales v.
Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 2006); Granados v. Quarterman, 455 F.3d 529,
537 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hall, 455 F.3d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2006); Knight v.
Quarterman, 186 F. App'x 518, 534-35 (5th Cir. 2006); Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d
441, 449 (5th Cir. 2006); Moore v. Dretke, 182 F. App'x 329, 337 (5th Cir. 2006); Moreno v.
Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2006); Mosley v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.
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relief on three occasions.9 9 During the five years prior to Wiggins,
though it heard forty-one claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, the Fifth Circuit granted relief to only three inmates.0 ° The
2006); Martinez v. Dretke, 173 F. App'x 347, 348 (5th Cir. 2006); Cannady v. Dretke, 173
F. App'x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2006); Pippin v. Dretke, 434 F.3d 782, 784 (5th Cir. 2005);
O'Brien v. Dretke, 156 F. App'x 724, 726 (5th Cir. 2005); Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552
(5th Cir. 2005); Draughon v. Dretke, 427 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 2005); Neville v. Dretke,
423 F.3d 474, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2005); Frazier v. Dretke, 145 F. App'x 866, 875 (5th Cir.
2005); Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2005); Ford v. Dretke, 135 F. App'x
769, 775 (5th Cir. 2005); Cardenas v. Dretke, 405 F.3d 244, 254 (5th Cir. 2005); Howard v.
Dretke, 125 F. App'x 560, 566 (5th Cir. 2005); Shields v. Dretke, 122 F. App'x 133, 154 (5th
Cir. 2005); Martinez v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 878, 891 (5th Cir. 2005); Ramirez v. Dretke, 398
F.3d 691, 699 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 2004);
Sterling v. Dretke, 117 F. App'x 328, 329 (5th Cir. 2004); Wolfe v. Dretke, 116 F. App'x
487, 488 (5th Cir. 2004); Roberts v. Dretke, 381 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2004); Cartwright
v. Dretke, 103 F. App'x 545, 546 (5th Cir. 2004); Martinez v. Dretke, 99 F. App'x 538, 544
(5th Cir. 2004); Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004); Cole v. Dretke, 99 F.
App'x 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2004); Morrow v. Dretke, 99 F. App'x 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2004); Sof-
far v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 480 (5th Cir. 2004), modified on reh'g, 391 F.3d 703 (5th Cir.
2004); Hood v. Dretke, 93 F. App'x 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2004); Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302,
303 (5th Cir. 2004); Kincy v. Dretke, 92 F. App'x 87, 88 (5th Cir. 2004); Cockrell v. Dretke,
88 F. App'x 34, 35 (5th Cir. 2004); Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 717 (5th Cir. 2004); Lew-
is v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2003); Kunkle v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980, 983 (5th
Cir. 2003); Flores v. Dretke, 82 F. App'x 92, 96 (5th Cir. 2003); Green v. Dretke, 82 F.
App'x 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2003); Moody v. Dretke, 77 F. App'x 722, 722 (5th Cir. 2003); La-
Grone v. Cockrell, No. 02-10976, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18150, at *18 (5th Cir. Sept. 2,
2003); Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 2003); Bruce v. Cockrell, 74 F. App'x
326, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2003); Perez v. Cockrell, 77 F. App'x 201, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2003);
Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 2003); Wilson v. Cockrell, 70 F. App'x 219,
229-30 (5th Cir. 2003); Allridge v. Quarterman, 92 F. App'x 60, 76 (5th Cir. 2003).
99. Relief was granted in Draughon v. Dretke, 427 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 2005); Sof-
far v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 480 (5th Cir. 2004), modified on reh'g, 391 F.3d 703 (5th Cir.
2004); and Lewis v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2003).
100. Relief was granted in Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 350 (5th Cir. 2001); Lock-
ett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 2000); and Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586,
622 (5th Cir. 1999).
The court denied relief in Henderson v. Cockrell, 333 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 2003);
Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2003); Black v. Cockrell, 314 F.3d 752,
755-57 (5th Cir. 2003); Harris v. Cockrell, 313 F.3d 238, 243-44 (5th Cir. 2002); Ladd v.
Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 234, 239 (5th
Cir. 2002); Collier v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 577, 588 (5th Cir. 2002); Ogan v. Cockrell, 297 F.3d
349, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2002); Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 770 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v.
Cockrell, 288 F.3d 713, 719 (5th Cir. 2002); Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir.
2002); Broxton v. Cockrell, 278 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2002); Santellan v. Cockrell, 271
F.3d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 2001); Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2001); Rudd
v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 472-73 (5th
Cir. 2001); Tucker v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001); Wheat v. Johnson, 238
F.3d 357, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2001); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 2000);
Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 284-85 (5th Cir. 2000); Knox v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 470,
481 (5th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Johnson, 213 F.3d 243, 249-250 (5th Cir. 2000); Soria v.
Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2000); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir.
2000); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1999); Lamb v. Johnson, 179 F.3d
352, 359 (5th Cir. 1999); Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 315 (1999); Beathard v. Johnson,
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Eleventh Circuit considered twenty-two claims of death row in-
mates following Wiggins'1 and granted relief on one occasion.1"2
During the five years prior to Wiggins, the Eleventh Circuit heard
thirty-five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 1 3 and relief
was granted on three occasions. 104 The Ninth Circuit, however,
177 F.3d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1999); Moreland v. Scott, 175 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1999);
Boyd v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 907, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1999); Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855,
857 (5th Cir. 1998); Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 804 (1998); Green v. Johnson, 160
F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 815 (1998); Vega v. John-
son, 149 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1998); Moody v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 483 (5th Cir.
1998); Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1998), overruled in part by Nel-
son v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2006); and Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062,
1064 (5th Cir. 1998).
101. Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008); Jennings v. McDonough,
490 F.3d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2007); Lynd v. Terry, 470 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006);
Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Terry, 466
F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006); Al-
derman v. Terry, 468 F.3d 775, 795 (11th Cir. 2006); Henyard v. McDonough, 459 F.3d
1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006); Hallford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006);
Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 2006); Zakrewski v. McDonough, 455
F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006); Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006);
McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006); Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d
799, 802 (11th Cir. 2006); Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 2006); Jones
v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300,
1318 (lth Cir. 2004); Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2004); Conklin
v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1195 (11th Cir. 2004); Hightower v. Schofield, 365 F.3d 1008,
1011 (11th Cir. 2004); Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2004); Turner v.
Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).
102. Relief was granted in Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008).
103. Parker v. Sec'y, 331 F.3d 764, 766 (11th Cir. 2003); Hardwick v. Crosby 320 F.3d
1127, 1130-31 (11th Cir. 2003); Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003);
Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002); Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 684
(11th Cir. 2002); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1045-46 (11th Cir. 2002); Robinson v.
Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1345-46, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2002); Fortenberry v. Haley, 297 F.3d
1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002); Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2002); Putnam v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2001); Mobley v. Head, 267
F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002); Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1208 (11th Cir. 2001);
Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Alabama, 256
F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001);
Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 841 (11th Cir. 2001); Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 909
(11th Cir. 2001); Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001); Gilreath v. Head,
234 F.3d 547, 548 (11th Cir. 2000); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 529 (11th Cir. 2000);
Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 953 (11th Cir. 2000); Glock v. Moore 195 F.3d 625, 626
(11th Cir. 1999); Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999); Williams v.
Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999); Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th
Cir. 1999); Hill v. Moore, 175 F.3d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1999); Wright v. Hooper, 169 F.3d
695, 698 (11th Cir. 1999); Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998); Duren
v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 667 (11th Cir. 1998); Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1302
(11th Cir. 1998); Baldwin v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998); Dobbs v. Tur-
pin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir. 1998); Oats v. Singletary, 141 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th
Cir. 1998); Bryan v. Singletary, 140 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1998); Neeley v. Nagle, 138
F.3d 917, 920 (11th Cir. 1998).
104. Relief was granted in Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1080 (11th Cir. 2002);
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considered eighteen ineffective assistance claims post-Wiggins' °5
and granted relief in ten cases. 116 Inmates were also more suc-
cessful in the Ninth Circuit than in the other circuits during the
five years prior to Wiggins, as the Ninth Circuit found that the
representation provided to death row inmates failed to meet con-
stitutional standards in eleven cases of the twenty-four brought
before it.' °7 On those occasions when defendants are successful, it
is usually on claims that their counsel was ineffective during the
sentencing phase of their capital cases, as opposed to ineffective
during the guilt/innocence phase of their cases.0'
Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir. 1998); and Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d
1184, 1204 (11th Cir. 1996).
105. Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 956 (9th Cir. 2008); Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d
834, 836 (9th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2008); Sten-
son v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2007); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 776 (9th
Cir. 2007); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007); Raley v. Ylst, 470
F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 2006); Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 2006); Frier-
son v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2006); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th
Cir. 2006); Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 945 (9th Cir. 2006); Daniels v. Woodford, 428
F.3d 1189, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005); Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2005);
Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 560 (9th Cir. 2005); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1180-81
(9th Cir. 2005); Allen v. Woodford, 366 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2004); Beardslee v. Wood-
ford, 358 F.3d 560, 565 (9th Cir. 2003); Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 865-66 (9th Cir.
2003).
106. Relief was granted in Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2008); Lam-
bright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1128 (9th Cir. 2007); Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578,
592 (9th Cir. 2006); Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 997 (9th Cir. 2006); Hovey v.
Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 931 (9th Cir. 2006); Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 945 (9th Cir.
2006); Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005); Summerlin v. Schriro,
427 F.3d 623, 643 (9th Cir. 2005); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005);
and Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. Relief was granted in Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1094-95 (9th Cir.
2003); Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2002); Viscotti v. Woodford,
288 F.3d 1097, 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd by 537 U.S. 19 (2002); Karis v. Calderon, 283
F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2002);
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2002); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d
915, 932-93 (9th Cir. 2001); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2001);
Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004,
1014 (9th Cir. 1999); and Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court denied relief in Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2003); Hayes v.
Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002); Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 976-77 (9th
Cir. 2002); Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Woodford,
258 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001);
Anderson v. Calderon, 253 F.3d 1053, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2000); Mayfield v. Calderon, 229
F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2000); Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998);
Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 1998); Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787,
789 (9th Cir. 1998); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998); and Siri-
pongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).
108. See, e.g., Correll, 539 F.3d at 956; Lawhorn, 519 F.3d at 1297; Lewis, 355 F.3d at
370.
2009] 1477
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Percentage of Successful
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Cases
5 Years 5 Years
Jurisdiction Before Wiggins After Wiggins
4th Circuit 0% 0%
5th Circuit 7.3% 3.8%
9th Circuit 45.8% 52.6%
11th Circuit 8.5% 4.5%
Based on this survey, my primary conclusion is that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wiggins does not appear to have had
much impact-defendants were no more likely to prevail after the
Wiggins decision than they were prior to the decision. In fact, in
two of the circuits, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, defendants
have actually fared worse. Only in the Ninth Circuit have defen-
dants fared slightly better post-Wiggins.
In addition, the few successful defendants were more likely to
have the court overturn their death sentences than their convic-
tions. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that it is less
burdensome for the state to retry the sentencing phase. Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that counsel must in-
vestigate and present compelling mitigation evidence during sen-
tencing,'0 9 and it is more likely to conclude that the defendant
suffered prejudice when counsel fails to do so. For instance, it is
easier for a court to conclude that a defendant was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to uncover mitigation evidence of serious child-
hood abuse than by counsel's failure to investigate a potential ali-
bi when there is evidence implicating the defendant.
Finally, I conclude that Justice Marshall's concern that the pre-
judice prong was too malleable has proven to be accurate." ° There
is evidence to suggest that the Fifth Circuit, for instance, may be
109. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003).
110. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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inclined to rule in favor of the state,"' and the prejudice prong
can be easily manipulated to do just that. There is also evidence
that the Ninth Circuit may be more inclined to rule favorably for
the defendant,"' and the prejudice prong permits that circuit to
follow its inclination.
While the decisions in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla-most
importantly Wiggins-have proven to be somewhat helpful in as-
sessing ineffective assistance claims during the sentencing phase,
the requirement that defendants prove prejudice continues to be
problematic. The prejudice prong is easy to manipulate. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court still has not clarified the showing
required to prove prejudice during the guilt-innocence phase of a
capital case. In Strickland, the Court held that the prejudice
prong is satisfied by a showing that "there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, absent [counsel's] errors, the factfinder would have
had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.""' In articulating the
prejudice standard, the Court rejected an outcome-determinative
standard: "[A] defendant need not show that counsel's deficient
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. " 14
The Supreme Court has also rejected a sufficiency of the evi-
dence test.1 5 Lower courts, however, routinely apply a sufficiency
of the evidence test in assessing prejudice during the guilt-
innocence phase."6 As long as there is sufficient evidence in the
record of the defendant's guilt, the courts usually excuse counsel's
111. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, Latest Reversal Par for the Court; 5th Circuit Rulings Often
Struck Down, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 27, 2005, at 1; Adam Liptak & Ralph
Blumenthal, Death Sentences in Texas Cases Try Supreme Court's Patience, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2004, at 1; Harvey Rice, 5th Circuit Court Rules in Its Own Way; Its Decisions Have
a History of Defying the Supreme Court, HOUS. CHRON., July 5, 2005, at Bi; Neil S. Siegel,
Op-Ed., Why President Bush Should Not Take the 5th; Judges Who Ignore Law Are Possi-
ble Court Candidates, HOUS. CHRON., June 17, 2005, at Bll.
112. See, e.g., Rone Tempest, Death Row Often Means a Long Life; California Con-
demns Many Murderers, but Few Are Ever Executed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at B1 (not-
ing that one important factor in the delay of executions in California is that "the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, serving California and consisting largely of Democratic appoin-
tees, is more likely to hear death penalty petitions than the more conservative appeals
courts serving Texas (5th Circuit) and Virginia (4th Circuit)").
113. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
114. Id. at 693.
115. In Strickland, the Court stated that "the appropriate test for prejudice finds its
roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by
the prosecution." Id. at 694 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 112-13
(1975)). The Court has said that the materiality test "is not a sufficiency of evidence test."
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
116. See, e.g., Halford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 2006).
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substandard performance and find that the defendant suffered no
prejudice."1 7 Courts are reluctant to overturn the convictions of
defendants they believe to be guilty and to burden the state with
117. See, e.g., Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2006). Davis alleged
that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview crucial witnesses and for not impeach-
ing some of the prosecution witnesses. Id. at 1253. Although there was no physical evi-
dence implicating Davis-no murder weapon was ever found and the case against him
consisted entirely of eyewitness testimony-the court held that "none of the testimony
which Davis asserts counsel should have obtained would overcome the prejudice require-
ment of Strickland in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial." Id. at 1256.
The Georgia Board of Parsons and Paroles granted Davis a ninety-day reprieve on the eve
of his execution after all but two of the eyewitnesses who testified against him recanted.
Amnesty International USA, Troy Davis-Finality Over Fairness, http://www.amnesty
usa.org/death-penalty/troy-davis-finality-over-fairness/page.do?id=1011343 (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
In Colvin-Ely v. Nuth, the defense "put on no proof during the guilt phase of the trial"
despite the existence of evidence suggesting the possibility of a different perpetrator, in-
cluding the "unidentified fingerprint found on the piece of paper in [the victim's] purse,
which [was] shown not to have been that of the [defendant]." Nos. 98-27, 98-29, 1999 WL
436776, at *2-3 (4th Cir. June 17, 1999). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the defendant was unable to prove prejudice and denied relief. Id. at *7. The Governor of
Maryland subsequently commuted the defendant's sentence to life because the Governor
"came to the conclusion that [the defendant] was almost certainly guilty of this horrible
crime, but 'almost certainly' is not strong enough." Thomas W. Waldron & Dennis O'Brien,
Glendening Acts To Stop Execution; Death Sentence Is Commuted to Life Imprisonment,
BALT. SUN, June 8, 2000, at Al.
In Anderson v. Quarterman, appellate counsel only raised three issues on direct appeal
because appellate counsel thought that raising other issues was a "waste of time." 204 F.
App'x 402, 410 (5th Cir. 2006). Although the court found that appellate counsel's perfor-
mance was deficient, relief was denied because the court found that the defendant had not
been prejudiced. Id. at 410.
In McFarland v. Scott, Justice Blackmun provided illustrations of cases in which defen-
dants clearly received substandard representation but were still unsuccessful in asserting
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard.
The impotence of the Strickland standard is perhaps best evidenced in the
cases in which ineffective-assistance claims have been denied. John Young,
for example, was represented in his capital trial by an attorney who was ad-
dicted to drugs and who a few weeks later was incarcerated on federal drug
charges. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Young's inef-
fective-assistance-of-counsel claim on federal habeas, and this Court denied
review. Young was executed in 1985 ....
Jesus Romero's attorney failed to present any evidence at the penalty
phase and delivered a closing argument totaling 29 words. Although the at-
torney later was suspended on unrelated grounds, Romero's ineffective-
assistance claim was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
and this Court denied certiorari. Romero was executed in 1992. Larry Heath
was represented on direct appeal by counsel who filed a 6-page brief before
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. The attorney failed to appear for
oral argument before the Alabama Supreme Court and filed a brief in that
court containing a 1-page argument and citing a single case. The Eleventh
Circuit found no prejudice, and this Court denied review. Heath was executed
in Alabama in 1992.
512 U.S. 1256, 1259-60 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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retrying cases many years later, when evidence may be lost and
witnesses' memories may be diminished.'18 However, an approach
that focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Strickland."9 Judge Harry Edwards has identi-
fied another flaw in such an approach:
The most serious flaw in the guilt-based approach.., is its tendency
to undermine our most important legal principles .... [Any analysis
measuring the harmlessness of error according to the weight of the
evidence that the prosecution stacks against a defendant erodes the
individual rights and liberties that are presumed to elevate our sys-
tem of justice. A focus on guilt skews the judicial assessment of har-
mlessness. The values that underlie the individual rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution, federal statutes, and procedural rules often
are general. Constitutional rights, in particular, often represent
broad ideals of individual liberty and human dignity. By contrast, a
criminal act appears vivid and almost tangible, so the need to punish
the guilty is both immediate and strongly felt. A wrong, often a
grievous wrong, has occurred, and the defendant, by all appearances,
is responsible. It is, therefore, to be expected that the desire to pu-
nish the guilty will frequently prevail over the need to honor indi-
vidual rights.
2 0
Part VI discusses a case that perfectly illustrates the continu-
ing problems with the prejudice prong.
VI. THE CONTINUING DIFFICULTY OF PROVING PREJUDICE:
THE CASE OF JOHNNY RAY CONNER
I was appointed to represent Johnny Ray Conner in his federal
habeas proceedings. Conner had been convicted of murdering the
owner of a Houston, Texas convenience store during a botched
robbery." 1 The State's evidence against Conner consisted of the
testimony of three eyewitnesses and a fingerprint found in the
store.
122
Six individuals claimed to have seen the assailant."3 The only
thing upon which they could agree was that the assailant ran
swiftly from the crime scene and that the assailant had no diffi-
118. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
119. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.
120. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Le-
gal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1194 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
121. Conner v. Dretke, No. H-02-4627, slip op. at 2, 4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2005).
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 2-4.
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culty running. 12 Witnesses gave varying descriptions of the assai-
lant to the police shortly after the crime. 125 One witness described
the assailant's height as between 5'10" and 6'1".126 The witnesses
disagreed as to the clothing worn by the assailant: he was de-
scribed as either wearing shorts above his knee or long pants be-
low his ankles, and some of the witnesses indicated that he wore
a baseball cap while others said that he did not.127 None of the
eyewitnesses indicated that the assailant had a tattoo on his face,
including the two eyewitnesses who said they observed the assai-
lant for an extended period of time at close range.
128
The Houston Police Department presented the six eyewitnesses
with a photo array.'29 Only three picked Mr. Conner out of the ar-
ray.13 0 One of the three eyewitnesses who made a positive identi-
fication admitted during the trial that she picked Conner out of
the photo array because his picture was the only one containing
Houston Police Department booking numbers.' 3 '
During their investigation, the police discovered a juice bottle
on the floor near the counter.'32 The State presented evidence
that one of the fingerprints on the bottle was Conner's.'33 Police
found another unidentified fingerprint on the bottle-the source
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 3. Mr. Conner's medical records indicated that he was 5'6" tall. Id. at 18.
127. Id. at 2-4.
128. Id. at 17-18. Mr. Conner had a "distinctive tattoo of a teardrop under his eye." Id.
at 18.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Id.
131. Martha Meyers testified as follows:
Q: Isn't it a fact, ma'am, the only particular individual in this particular
grouping that has any type of numbers that denotes any type of police record
is number five?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would that have anything to have done [sic] with you picking out number
five?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you absolutely positive about that?
A: Yes sir.
Transcript of Record at 51, Conner v. Texas, No. 785421 (Dist. Ct. Harris County, TX,
June 7, 1999) (testimony on file with University of Richmond Law Review).
132. Conner, No. H-02-4627, at 4.
133. See id.
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of which neither defense counsel nor the police made any effort to
ascertain. 1
3 4
Trial counsel presented no defense other than cross-examining
the prosecution's witnesses, and Conner was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.135 After Conner was sentenced, it was discovered
that, prior to the crime, Conner had broken his right leg, which
resulted in traumatic nerve damage to his right peroneal nerve
and the development of a condition known as "foot drop."1 36 Foot
drop would make it difficult for Conner to have run in a normal
manner.1"7 Conner's condition had been documented in his medi-
cal records. 38 However, trial counsel never consulted Conner's
medical records, and, as a result, never investigated the possibili-
ty that Conner could not run-even though six eyewitnesses indi-
cated that the assailant ran swiftly from the crime scene.'39
Because I was unable to bring an actual innocence claim, 40 I
brought a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel instead.14 ' I
claimed on Conner's behalf that, as a result of trial counsel's fail-
ure to review Conner's medical records and to submit them for
analysis by an appropriate expert, trial counsel was ineffective,
given the fact that the witnesses had stated the assailant had no
difficulty running fast.
142
The federal district court found that Conner satisfied both
prongs of Strickland.'11 According to the court, "lead trial counsel
Ricardo Rodriguez decided before trial that he would invest little
time and effort into contesting Conner's guilt. As a result of this
decision, Rodriguez conducted very little investigation into Con-
134. See id.
135. Id. at 4, 6, 12.
136. Id at 10, 13.
137. Id. at 17. "Foot drop is caused by weakness or paralysis of the muscles on the side
of the shinbone, and causes the toes to drag and the foot to hang." Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id. at 12, 14, 16-17.
140. In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that "a truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution
of a defendant unconstitutional." 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). The Court, however, had never
held such a claim to be cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding prior to my filing of Mr.
Conner's federal habeas claim. Subsequent to my filing, the Court did recognize that an
inmate who could make a clear showing of his innocence could pursue claims not previous-
ly presented in state court. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006).
141. Conner, No. H-02-4627, at 10.
142. Id. at 10-18.
143. Id. at 14, 18.
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ner's background, and no investigation into Conner's medical his-
tory."' 4 The district court held that trial counsel's decision was
unreasonable in light of the ABA guidelines:
In this case, had counsel conducted a prompt and reasonably diligent
investigation into any possible mitigating evidence in Conner's med-
ical history, they would have discovered before trial that Conner suf-
fers from foot drop, and they could have used this evidence to further
undermine the State's already weak case. Counsel's investigation
therefore fell below objective standards of professionally reasonable
conduct. 145
The district court also held that trial counsel's deficient per-
formance prejudiced Conner:
[Tihe State's case against Conner was weak. While the testimony of
six witnesses all identifying Conner as the gunman may have
seemed compelling, the testimony of these witnesses was riddled
with inconsistencies. In addition to the explicit inconsistencies, two
of the witnesses testified that they saw the gunman's face for an ex-
tended period, yet neither testified that the gunman had Conner's
distinctive tattoo of a teardrop under his eye-a tattoo about which
the prosecution made much ado during the sentencing phase....
Yet, there is significant evidence before this Court that Conner could
not run without lifting his entire right leg and throwing his foot for-
ward because of his foot drop-a physical fact that would result in a
very distinctive gait, and one discoverable through a review of Con-
ner's medical records. In light of the glaring inconsistencies in the
witness identification testimony and the lack of physical evidence
against Conner, counsel's failure to discover and present this evi-
dence-evidence that would have cast grave doubt on whether Con-
ner was the person the witnesses actually saw-is sufficient to un-
dermine confidence in the outcome of Conner's trial.'
46
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district
court's grant of habeas relief.'47 The Fifth Circuit did not address
the trial counsel's performance. 148 Instead, the Court held that
Conner was not entitled to relief because he "cannot show preju-
dice resulting from his counsel's alleged deficiency in not review-
ing his medical history."4 ' The Fifth Circuit held, without ac-
knowledging the flaws in the evidence, that Conner could not
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id. at 16.
146. Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
147. Conner v. Quarterman, 477 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2007).
148. Id. at 293-94.
149. Id. at 294.
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establish prejudice because he "has done nothing to lessen the
impact of the other evidence against him," including the eyewit-
ness identifications and the fingerprint in the store.
15
Instead of analyzing whether there should be confidence in a
conviction in which trial counsel failed to conduct an investiga-
tion into potentially exculpatory evidence and whether confidence
is warranted when that conviction is based solely on flawed eye-
witness testimony and unreliable fingerprint analysis, contrary to
the mandate of Strickland, the Fifth Circuit merely applied a suf-
ficiency of the evidence test.'5 ' Most courts have analyzed the pre-
judice prong in a similar manner.'52 The problem with analyzing
the prejudice prong in this way, however, is that there will almost
always be evidence implicating the defendant, and this is the
primary reason that defendants prevail so infrequently on inef-
fective assistance claims.
This case highlights some of the problems with the prejudice
prong even after the Supreme Court decisions in Williams, Wig-
gins, and Rompilla. Courts are likely to find that the defendant
was not prejudiced as long as there is evidence implicating him,
and, in most cases, such evidence will exist.
VII. PROPOSAL
It is my belief that the situation will not drastically improve
until the Supreme Court totally abandons the prejudice prong. At
the present time, states have little incentive to ensure that de-
fendants receive quality representation. They know that the
chances of a defendant prevailing on an ineffective assistance
claim are minimal. However, if defendants did not have to prove
prejudice, they would prevail much more frequently. The states
would want to avoid the expense of retrials and, therefore, would
devote greater resources to ensure that defendants receive com-
petent trial attorneys. Trial judges are also aware that, under the
current Strickland standard, the chances of a reversal are slim,
so they do not have enough incentive to take sufficient care in ap-
150. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari, though Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg voted to stay Conner's execution. Conner v. Quarterman, 128 S. Ct. 24
(2007). On August 22, 2007, Mr. Conner was executed. Texas Executes 400th Inmate Since
1982, MSNBC, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20398934.
151. See Conner, 477 F.3d at 293-94.
152. See, e.g., Hallford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 2006).
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pointing counsel. That would change if defendants were not re-
quired to prove prejudice and cases were reversed more frequent-
ly.
While I have concluded that the prejudice prong should be dis-
carded altogether, others have proposed merely tinkering with
the prejudice prong. In Strickland, the Supreme Court placed the
burden of proving prejudice on the defendant.153 An obvious al-
ternative would be to place the burden on the government. That
is, the government would have to prove that the defendant suf-
fered no prejudice as a result of counsel's poor performance.
Judge Bazelon made such a proposal in United States v. Decos-
ter.' According to Judge Bazelon, "To place the burden on the de-
fendant would require him to establish the likelihood of his inno-
cence."' The problem with requiring the defendant to prove his
innocence, according to Judge Bazelon, is that "[tihe presumption
of innocence that cloaks the accused cannot be stripped by a con-
viction obtained in something less than a constitutionally ade-
quate trial."156 Judge Bazelon emphasized that the government's
burden should not be met simply by pointing to evidence of the
defendant's guilt:
To satisfy its burden of establishing lack of prejudice, it is not
enough for the government simply to point to the evidence of guilt
adduced at trial, no matter how overwhelming such evidence may be.
In the first place, "proof of prejudice may well be absent from the
record precisely because counsel has been ineffective." When, as in
this case, ineffectiveness is founded upon gross omissions of counsel
rather than specific errors, counsel's violations so permeate the trial
that they necessarily cast doubt on the entire adjudicative process.
Even where the consequences of counsel's omissions are less perva-
sive, it will generally be impossible to know precisely how the pro-
ceedings were affected, and the resulting prejudice will be "incapable
of any sort of measurement." As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
"The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice resulting from its denial."
Moreover, "prejudice" to the defendant may take many forms. The li-
kelihood of acquittal at trial is not the only touchstone against which
the consequence of counsel's failures is to be measured. The duties of
153. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
154. 624 F.2d 196, 287-89 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 291.
156. Id. (footnote omitted).
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an attorney extend to many areas not necessarily affecting the out-
come of trial. As the present case highlights, inadequate investiga-
tion and preparation may prejudice the defendant not only at trial
but before trial-in counsel's inability to offer informed, competent
advice on whether to plead guilty and whether to demand a jury tri-
al-as well as after trial-in providing ineffective representation at
sentencing.
157
While Judge Bazelon's proposal sounds good in theory and is
certainly worthy of consideration, I do not think it would be much
of an improvement over the present situation. Even if the burden
is shifted to the government to prove lack of prejudice, the gov-
ernment will continue to point to the defendant's guilt as evi-
dence that the defendant suffered no prejudice, and courts will
continue to utilize a guilt-based approach because of their desire
to uphold convictions and to avoid forcing states to retry cases.
Another alternative to abolishing the prejudice prong is to al-
low the prejudice prong to be satisfied if the defendant can dem-
onstrate that counsel's failure to perform adequately, such as by
failing to interview crucial witnesses, raises a reasonable doubt
about his guilt. The problem with this alternative is that it puts
the burden on the defendant to prove his innocence-so it is no
improvement over the present situation. Likewise, a prejudice
standard that is met by proof that counsel's performance had a
conceivable effect on the outcome is inadequate for the same rea-
sons.
Others have suggested that prejudice could be presumed under
certain circumstances. 58 Defendants are not required to make the
Strickland prejudice showing where the defendant actually or ef-
fectively had no counsel, 159 where defense counsel was not li-
censed to practice, 6 ' and where counsel had an actual conflict of
interest.'6 ' Thus, prejudice could be presumed in the event that
counsel failed to perform certain tasks, such as failing to investi-
gate a potential alibi. The problem with this approach, however,
157. Id. at 291-93 (footnotes omitted).
158. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB.
L. REv. 425, 465-70 (1996).
159. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).
160. See United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2nd Cir. 1990).
161. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).
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is in distinguishing situations when prejudice ought to be pre-
sumed from situations when it ought not be presumed.
The Supreme Court took a step forward by adopting the guide-
lines approach in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla.162 The guide-
lines reflect the minimal preparation required for a capital case.
There can be no confidence in an outcome in which the counsel of
an individual sentenced to death failed to perform reasonably,
and unreasonable performance alone should be sufficient to war-
rant a new trial without any showing of prejudice. Abandoning
the prejudice requirement would also have a deterrent effect. As
stated, states and trial judges have shown little interest in ensur-
ing that defendants receive competent representation. If defen-
dants did not have to prove prejudice, reversals would increase,
and states and trial judges would put more care into selecting
counsel. Although Judge Bazelon favored retaining the prejudice
requirement, he conceded, "[Ilt may be that only a rule requiring
automatic reversal can provide the deterrent effect necessary to
ensure that all defendants-innocent or guilty-receive the effec-
tive assistance of counsel."163
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are many problems with the way the death penalty is
administered. For instance, race often distorts who is sentenced
to death,1" and prospective jurors with moral qualms about the
death penalty are often removed." 5 An even greater problem is
that many defendants lack adequate legal representation during
trial. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of
counsel, especially in capital cases. Yet, there has been a break-
down in the adversarial system because so many defendants are
being convicted and sentenced to death as a result of substandard
representation. Strickland's prejudice prong is primarily respon-
sible for this result. The states and trial judges who preside over
capital trials have proven to be either disinterested or ineffectual
162. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005).
163. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing).
164. See American Civil Liberties Union, Race and the Death Penalty, Feb. 26, 2003,
http://www.aclu.orgcapital/unequal/10389pub20030226.html.
165. See Greene v. State, 469 S.E.2d 129, 145 (Ga. 1996) (Bentham, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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in ensuring the proper functioning of the adversarial system.
Death row inmates lack the political clout to change the situation
through the political process. Therefore, only the Supreme Court
can ensure that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective as-
sistance of counsel is realized-and that will only happen by
completely abandoning Strickland's prejudice prong.
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APPENDIX
SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Prior to Wiggins:
Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998). Counsel was in-
effective for failing to pursue and present evidence of petitioner's
unfortunate childhood, including evidence that his mother often
would not let him stay in the house with her, and when she did
allow him to stay, she ran a brothel where she exposed him to
sexual promiscuity, alcohol, and violence. Additionally, the court
found counsel's closing argument at sentencing to be inadequate,
during which counsel first read Justice Brennan's concurring opi-
nion in Furman v. Georgia and then argued that the current
death penalty statute would also be found unconstitutional.
Counsel's argument was that the current statute minimized the
jury's responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
death penalty and failed to focus on the character and record of
the defendant.
Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1999). Counsel was
found to be ineffective for failing to present evidence that peti-
tioner had a gentle disposition and a record of helping his family
in times of need, that petitioner had performed acts of heroism
and compassion, and that petitioner was under severe stress at
the time of the crimes due to his recent job loss, his poverty, and
his diabetic condition. The court found that the jury was not "pre-
sented with the particularized circumstances of his past and of
his actions on the day of the crime that would have allowed them
fairly to balance the seriousness of his transgressions with the
conditions of his life." Id. at 1204. Had the jury heard this infor-
mation, the court "believe[d] that is [was] at least reasonably
possible that the jury would have returned a sentence other than
death." Id.
Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). Counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to present the testimony of three witnesses who
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stated that they had seen the murder victim the day after peti-
tioner allegedly murdered her.
Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner was
granted a resentencing hearing. At petitioner's resentencing pro-
ceeding, counsel presented only the same mitigation testimony
that had already been rejected by the trial judge at petitioner's
first sentencing proceeding. As a result, counsel was found to
have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1999). The court found
that petitioner had been prejudiced at his sentencing hearing due
to trial counsel's numerous, egregious failures.
Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). Sentencing
phase relief was granted as a result of counsel's failure to compile
petitioner's social history, which would have yielded useful miti-
gating evidence; failure to present available expert medical tes-
timony that petitioner lacked the capacity to think consciously at
the time of the crime; and failure to investigate the facts underly-
ing one of the aggravating factors.
Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2000). The court found
trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present evi-
dence "that [petitioner] suffers from a personality disorder and a
brain abnormality associated with a documented history of sei-
zures" along with evidence that petitioner's "seizures may have
resulted from temporal lobe epilepsy, caused either organically or
as a result of repeated falls as a youth." Id.
Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001). Court found
that petitioner was denied counsel during a critical stage of his
proceedings when his "counsel was repeatedly asleep, and hence
unconscious... through a not insubstantial portion of the 12
hour and 51 minute trial." Id. at 349. The court rejected the
state's argument that petitioner had to demonstrate actual preju-
dice because "[s]uch absence of counsel at a critical stage of a pro-
ceeding makes the adversary process unreliable." Id.
Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001). The court
found that "counsel engaged in minimal preparation ... [having]
interviewed one defense witness for only ten minutes on the
morning she was scheduled to testify," that "counsel failed to ex-
amine [petitioner's] employment records, medical records, prison
records, past probation reports, and military records," even
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though these materials were "readily available"; counsel "abdi-
cated the investigation of [petitioner's] psychosocial history to one
of [his] female relatives"; counsel "failed to present ... evidence of
[petitioner's] positive adjustment to prison life during his pre-
vious incarcerations"; and counsel's lack of preparation of one de-
fense witness resulted in direct testimony which opened the door
to cross-examination eliciting evidence that petitioner had
planned to commit another crime. Id. at 875. Had counsel under-
taken the necessary investigation he would have discovered the
following: petitioner had a history of severe substance abuse dat-
ing back to childhood; petitioner "grew up in a household where
both his mother and father were volatile alcoholics and alcoholic
arguments occurred nightly"; petitioner's "father was physically,
verbally and emotionally abusive.., and on at least two occa-
sions attempted to kill the young boy"; petitioner blamed himself
for his father's suicide, suffered from severe depression and had
attempted suicide at least six times by slashing his wrists. Id.
Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth
Circuit granted relief on petitioner's claim that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase
of his capital case. Counsel's primary failing was that he failed to
call an endocrinologist to explain the effects of petitioner's di-
abetes, or a toxicologist to explain petitioner's substance abuse.
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Cir-
cuit granted sentencing phase relief on petitioner's ineffective as-
sistance claim as a result of counsel's failure to investigate peti-
tioner's background, including his family, criminal, substance
abuse, and mental health history, "based entirely on an overbroad
acquiescence in his client's demand that he refrain from calling
his parents as witnesses." Id. at 846.
Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002). Sentencing
phase relief was granted as a result of trial counsel's failure to in-
vestigate and present evidence that petitioner endured brutal vi-
olence at the hands of his father and step-father, and that he wit-
nessed similar violent acts committed against his mother by both
men.
Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002). Relief was
granted as a result of trial counsel's failure to investigate and
present available evidence suggesting that as a result of petition-
er's long-term methamphetamine use including on the night of
1492 [Vol. 43:1459
DEFENDANTS ON DEATH ROW
the murder, petitioner lacked the capacity to form the intent ne-
cessary for first degree murder.
Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2002). Sentencing
phase relief was granted as a result of counsel's failure to present
evidence of petitioner's "severe intellectual limitations." Id. at
1072. The court explained that evidence of petitioner's diminished
mental capacity "is particularly significant in light of... Atkins v.
Virginia" and noted that "it is abundantly clear that an individu-
al 'right on the edge' of mental retardation suffers some of the
same limitations on reasoning, understanding, and impulse con-
trol as those described by the Supreme Court in Atkins." Id. at
1073.
Post-Wiggins:
Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). Due to an in-
adequate investigation, counsel failed to discover several items
regarding petitioner's background, including: information indicat-
ing that a psychologist who examined petitioner in connection
with an earlier offense had determined that petitioner may have
been incompetent to stand trial and was reasonably certain to
have lacked the capacity to plan and execute the actions with
which he had been charged; detailed evidence of petitioner's im-
poverished upbringing at the hands of abusive foster parents who
would often lock him in a closet for extended periods of time; evi-
dence that, while incarcerated earlier in life, petitioner was gang-
raped by other inmates; and evidence of possible brain damage
resulting from petitioner's long-term exposure to toxic solvents
while restoring furniture and/or a head injury sustained during
an automobile accident.
Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003). The court found
counsel ineffective for inadequately presenting petitioner's alibi
defense. This was especially important given the fact that peti-
tioner had been convicted based on inconsistent eyewitness iden-
tifications, suspect jailhouse testimony and no physical evidence
linked petitioner to the murder.
Lewis v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2003). Petitioner's death
sentence was reversed as a result of counsel's failure "to investi-
gate mitigating evidence of his abusive childhood." Id. at 366-67.
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Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2004). Counsel ineffective
for failing to investigate and present available evidence support-
ing their trial theory that petitioner's incriminating statements to
law enforcement was false. Counsel failed to interview the sole
survivor of the robbery that resulted in the deaths of three others.
The court also found counsel ineffective for failing to consult a
ballistics expert to examine critical crime scene evidence for dis-
crepancies between that evidence and the contents of the state-
ments petitioner signed for police over three days of uncounseled
interrogation.
Boyde v. Browne, 404 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2005). Sentencing phase
relief was granted on petitioner's claim that trial counsel was in-
effective for failing to develop and present readily available miti-
gating evidence of the abuse he suffered as a child from his moth-
er and stepfather.
Draughon v. Dretke, 427 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2005). Counsel was
found to be ineffective for failing to investigate and present evi-
dence contradicting the state's theory of how the fatal shooting
occurred.
Summerlin v. Schiro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005). Counsel was
found to be ineffective for failing to conduct any family, social his-
tory investigation or mental health investigation, and therefore
did not learn that petitioner suffered abuse as a child, was func-
tionally mentally retarded, and had been diagnosed with parano-
id schizophrenia.
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005). The court
found counsel's performance to be deficient for several reasons:
counsel (1) relied primarily on one inexperienced psychologist,
who had conducted only a cursory screening of petitioner; (2)
failed to follow up when this preliminary screening suggested
that petitioner suffered form a mental disorder; (3) failed to follow
up on evidence of paranoia; (4) failed to review Daniel's family
and social history which described a family history of mental ill-
ness; (5) failed to investigate whether the medication prescribed
for Daniels impacted his state of mind at the time of the shoot-
ings; and (6) failed to investigate petitioner's use of illegal sub-
stances, in particular, the combined impact of these with the pre-
scription medications on his state of mind.
Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006). The court found
counsel ineffective for advising petitioner to reject a plea bargain
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under which he could have pled guilty to first-degree murder in
exchange for the state's withdrawal of the death penalty as a sen-
tencing option.
Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006). Counsel ineffective
for failing to supply a key expert witness with documentation
supporting the expert's schizophrenia diagnosis and other infor-
mation about petitioner's conduct around the time of the offense.
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006). Although this
was petitioner's third trial, counsel failed to read the record of the
prior proceedings, and therefore failed to learn of various sources
of evidence indicating possible organic brain dysfunction pre-
dating the offense. Counsel also failed to locate and review avail-
able school, hospital, prison and juvenile records showing a histo-
ry of head injuries and IQ scores of 71 and 90, and counsel failed
to consult a neurologist about petitioner's head injuries, despite
having been made aware of them.
Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). Sentencing phase
relief was granted by the court, finding that counsel had been in-
effective for failing to investigate and present available mitigat-
ing evidence, including substantial evidence that petitioner was
one of six children abused and neglected by a mother whose
commitment to her religion came before her commitment to her
children; a brick wall fell on petitioner's head when he was seven
years old, likely causing brain damage; petitioner began using
drugs to self-medicate by age ten; all six children in petitioner's
family had substance abuse problems, five spent time in juvenile
facilities, and all four boys spent time in adult prisons; he was
cast out of his parents' home and became a ward of the state and
quickly acquired an addiction to heroin; and at the time of the of-
fenses in this case, petitioner was a heavy methaphetamine user,
which likely caused impulse control problems, judgment impair-
ment and aggressiveness.
Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 2006). Counsel was
found to be ineffective for requesting a jury instruction which re-
lieved the prosecution of its obligation to present evidence to cor-
roborate the accomplice testimony on which its case was built.
Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2007). The court
reversed petitioner's death sentence after finding that counsel
was ineffective. According to the court, counsel "spent only five
and a half hours obtaining evidence and preparing for he penalty
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phase," id. at 39, and "failed to do even a minimal investigation of
'classic mitigation evidence,' notwithstanding the fact that he
knew such evidence potentially existed." Id. 36. Such evidence
consisted of two prior suicide attempts; a prior psychiatric hospi-
talization; traumatic experiences in Vietnam; an antisocial perso-
nality disorder diagnosis by a court psychologist; a serious drug
problem; and an abusive and neglectful upbringing.
Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's grant of sentencing phase relief
as a result of counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase.
Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). Counsel waived
closing argument at sentencing under the mistaken belief that
the prosecutor would be precluded from making a closing argu-
ment. Alabama law, however, provides the trial judge with the
discretion to permit or deny the prosecution a closing argument.
Counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct adequate legal re-
search on this point.
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